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The Taxation of Borrowing
WILLIAM D. POPKIN*
Borrowed funds, as we all know, are not income.' The Supreme Court
has held that funds subject to a consensual agreement recognizing the
obligation to repay are not taxable,2 and saw no need to justify that con-
clusion. The doctrinal foundation for the exclusion of loans from income
suggests, however, that a justification is necessary. Loans are excluded
from income because they do not provide the taxpayer with accretion to
net wealth,3 the zero accretion being recognized by accruing the obliga-
tion to repay the debt in the future to the year the loan proceeds are
received.' A strict application of the net wealth accretion definition of
income by accruing debt is hardly a foregone conclusion, however. First,
obligations to pay in the future are often not accrued5 and, in any event,
the Commissioner is thought to have wide discretion in determining
whether such accrual would distort income.' Second, the exclusion of a
loan from income defers tax since the loan must be repaid out of after-
tax funds.7 The exclusion's resulting in deferral suggests that the out-
come is far from inevitable, given the uncertainty of timing rules in tax
law.'
*A.B. 1958, LL.B. 1961, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Indiana University
School of Law, Bloomington.
' Shuster v. Helvering, 121 F.2d 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1941); Oliver v. United States, 193 F.-
Supp. 930, 934 (E.D. Ark. 1961); Stayton v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 940, 942-43 (1935). Corn--
pare Mantell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1143, 1148 (1952) (security deposit paid by tenant not
taxable even though available to landlord for current use) with August v. Commissioner, 17
T.C. 1165 (1952) (prepaid rent taxable). But see I.R.C. § 77 (taxpayer can elect to be taxed on
certain loans).
2 James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961).
Spartan Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D.S.C. 1977) ("his net
worth being unchanged, there is no taxable economic gain").
' Gibson Prods. Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (including
loan in basis analogous to accrual of debt).
' See text accompanying notes 11-22 infra. See also Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409
(1940) (note not "payment"); Vander Poel, Francis & Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 407 (1947)
(no constructive payment doctrine).
8 I.R.C. § 446(b).
' If the loan had been taxable, the repayment would be deductible and tax would not be
deferred until the year of repayment. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961);
McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978); Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50.
When a farmer elects under I.R.C. § 77 to include a loan in income, repayment is deductible
by adding the repayment to the cost of property pledged as collateral for the loan. Rev. Rul.
80-19, 1980-1 C.B. 9.
s See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 925, 958-73 (1967); Bittker, Accounting for Federal 'Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244, 249 (1969).
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The failure to perceive that this exclusion is only deferral accom-
plished by accruing unpaid debt has produced serious distortions in the
tax law which could be avoided if the doctrinal foundations for taxing
borrowing were better understood. The first section of this article will
explain why tax deferral of loans is not inherently objectionable in an in-
come tax. The second section will discuss the criteria by which pay-
ments are taxed in the year of receipt notwithstanding the existence of
an obligation to repay, and will compare these situations to loans. The
third section will explain when the accrual of unpaid debt to defer taxa-
tion of loans cannot be justified. The final section will then compare the
taxation of borrowing in a consumption tax with the income tax rules.
TAX DEFERRED LOANS -THE LOGIC OF THE INCOME TAX
The deferral of tax on borrowing is not inherently objectionable in an
income tax, absent the special circumstances discussed later in this arti-
cle. In an income tax, the rate at which current consumption can be sub-
stituted for future consumption by saving is higher than in the absence
of a tax.' For example, if an individual has $100 in year 1 in a no-tax
world which he can invest at 15%, he has a choice between consuming
$100 in year 1 or $115 in year 2, a 10/11.5 ratio. If the individual is sub-
ject to a 40% income tax, he needs $166.66 in year 1 to obtain $100 con-
sumption. If he defers that consumption to year 2, he must pay a further
40% tax on the $15 gain, leaving him with $109, a 10/10.9 ratio.
The deferral of tax on borrowing also has the effect of favoring the
borrower's decision to consume in the earlier year. This is illustrated in
Table I, which describes two taxpayers, each with an opportunity to
consume $100 in year 1 or defer consumption until year 2. Both tax-
payers are in the 40% bracket in both years. Taxpayer A obtains the op-
portunity to consume $100 by earning $166.66 taxable income; Taxpayer
B can borrow $100 tax-free at 15% interest. To make the two taxpayers
equal in all other respects, we assume that they both obtain $191.66 of
taxable income in year 2; this will be more than sufficient to allow the
borrower to repay the loan with interest. In addition, we assume that
Taxpayer A, who has $166.66 taxable income, can earn a 15% return if
he saves rather than consumes in year 1, because that is the amount the
borrower can retain for his own use if he defers consumption by not bor-
rowing, thereby avoiding payment of 15% interest. Table I shows that
both taxpayers can increase consumption by the same amount ($109) if
they defer consumption to year 2. If the loan had been taxed in year 1,
' Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1155 n.97 (1974).
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the borrower would not receive the same advantage for early consump-
tion. This is illustrated by Taxpayer C, who receives a taxable loan of
$166.66 to obtain $100 for consumption in year 1. Taxing the loan in year
1 increases to $115 the amount by which the taxpayer can increase con-
sumption by not borrowing and deferring consumption until year 2."°
The basic decision to defer tax on borrowing in an income tax is, there-
fore, an implementation of the inherent bias in an income tax for current
over future consumption, and raises no problems other than those
raised more generally by the decision to adopt an income rather than a
consumption tax.
TABLE I
Consumption in Deferral of
Year Received Consumption Until
Year 2
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2
TAXPAYER A:a
Taxable Income $166.66 $191.66 $166.66 $30 6 .6 6b
Tax 66.66 76.66 66.66 82.66
Opportunity to Consume 100.00 115.00 0.00 224.00
TAXPAYER B:a
Taxable Income 0.00 176.66c 0.00 191.66
Tax 0.00 70.66 0.00 76.66
Opportunity to Consume 100.00 6 .0 0d 0.00 115.00
TAXPAYER C:a
Taxable Income 166.66 0.00e 0.00 191.66
Tax 66.66 0.00 0.00 76.66
Opportunity to Consume 100.00 0.00f 0.00 115.00
aAll taxpayers are subject to a 40% income tax.
b$1 0 0 .0 0 (after-tax income of year 1) + $15.00 (15% return) + $191.66.
c$191.66 - $15.00 (15% interest on $100.00 debt).
$191.66 [$115.00 (15% interest and debt repayment) + $70.66 (income tax)].
e$191.66 - [$25.00 (15% interest on $166.66 debt) + $166.66 (debt repayment)]. Debt
repayment is deductible because the loan is taxable.
f$191.66 - $191.66 (15% interest and debt repayment).
10 Adoption of a consumption tax would put the borrower taxed in year 1 in the same
position as the taxpayer with taxable receipts sufficient to finance the same amount of con-
sumption, with respect to the advantage they obtain by deferring consumption until year 2.
If only consumption is taxed, the taxpayer with taxable receipts of $166.66 in year 1 and
$191.66 in year 2, can consume $100 in year 1 and $115 in year 2. If he delays year 1 con-
sumption until year 2, earning the same 15% as we assumed in Table I, he would have $230
to consume in year 2, which is $115 more than in year 1. The $230 is the result of $383.32 of
taxable receipts ($166.66 plus 15% of $166.66 plus $191.66) minus a 40% tax on those
receipts ($153.32).
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TAXING RECEIPTS SUBJECT TO AN OBLIGATION TO REPAY
Tax is not always deferred on funds which the taxpayer is obligated
to repay. An embezzler, for example, must pay tax in the year money is
embezzled.11 In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the use of a net
wealth accretion theory to explain why embezzled funds were taxable
but loans were not, 2 presumably because the value of the obligation to
repay some loans does not equal the loan, and the obligation to repay
embezzled funds is not always worthless. Instead, the Court emphasized
a different doctrine, that of dominion and control, as the reason for tax-
ing embezzled funds." Use of this doctrine allowed the Court to take an
all or nothing approach to the taxation of money received subject to an
obligation to repay. When there was sufficient dominion and control, the
entire amount of the receipts would be taxable, subject to an offsetting
deduction in the year of repayment. 4 Absent sufficient dominion and
control, as is presumably true of loans, the money would not be taxable
when received, but would be taxed at a later date if the repayment did
not occur.1 5 This application of the dominion and control doctrine, re-
quires an explanation as to why embezzlement differs from borrowing
so significantly that embezzled funds should be taxed but loans should
be tax-free.
The critical distinction between embezzlement and borrowing is that
the embezzler usually has much greater control over whether and when
to repay the funds. There are three significant tax policy reasons why
such control argues for taxation in the year of receipt. First, the in-
crease in the likelihood that the funds will have to be reported as in-
come sometime argues for including them at the most convenient time,
which is the year cash is received. Delaying tax until repayment
becomes unlikely places a heavy burden on the government to identify
whether and when such an event has occurred. Second, control over the
timing of repayment allows the taxpayer to choose a low tax year to
repay, thereby enjoying use of the borrowed funds in a high tax year
" James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (overruling Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327
U.S. 404 (1946)).
2 This position was urged by the government in the Brief for the United States at 23,
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
" James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 217 (1961). The doctrine of dominion and control
is far more pervasive in the tax law than is the net wealth accretion doctrine. It recurs in
doctrinal settings as varied as determining who the taxpayer is, see, e.g., Helvering v. Clif-
ford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930), what constitutes
income, see, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955), and when
income arises, see, e.g., North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1932).
' James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961).
12 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (d931) (corporation's purchase of its
own bonds for less than par value results in taxable gain to the extent that par exceeds pur-
chase price).
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but paying tax on the funds used to repay the loan in a low tax year.
Third, the discretion to postpone payment gives the embezzler a psy-
chological affinity to the taxpayer who obtains funds not subject to
repayment. This point has been made most effectively in a case dealing
with an accrual basis taxpayer who sought to accrue a debt payable
some twenty or more years in the future." The court disallowed accrual,
noting that the taxpayer lacked "invisible strings" on the use of the
money; he did not even have "an eye to the upcoming expenses."17 This
case embodies the idea that the future is uncertain; as the time for
repayment recedes into the future, the burden of payment weighs so
lightly on the taxpayer that it is unfair to taxpayers in receipt of tax-
able income to distinguish them from other taxpayers in receipt of
funds because of a future obligation to repay. The embezzler, even more
than the taxpayer who must pay in twenty or more years, lacks "invisi-
ble strings."
Another distinction between the embezzler and the borrower is the
undesirability of the embezzler's activity. Any doubts that might exist
on the question of dominion and control in the year of receipt are, there-
fore, likely to be resolved against the embezzler. By contrast, the effect
of taxing borrowing in the year of the loan would seriously disrupt a
common commercial activity.
The relevance of these considerations emerges clearly in .cases in
which a taxpayer improperly receives funds which he then agrees to
repay. In Buff v. Commissioner,8 the taxpayer had embezzled over
$20,000 from his employer. When he was caught later the same year he
agreed to repay the funds, signed a note to that effect, borrowed $1,000
from a bank to begin repayment and agreed to have $25 per week with-
held from his salary until the money was repaid. The tax court was very
impressed with the steps taken to repay the funds and held that the tax-
payer did not have to include the embezzled funds in income. 9 The Sec-
ond Circuit disagreed, stressing that the obligation to repay had no
value. 0 Given the fact that the employer, rather than the employee, ter-
minated the wage withholding agreement,"' this finding surely under-
stated the value of the debt. Still, by the standards discussed earlier,'
Buff was properly taxed in the year he received the money. The chances
of his not making good on the debt were considerable, and the fifteen
years it would have taken, at $25 per week, to pay the debt was a long
" Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 409.
496 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1974).
, Buff v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 224 (1972).
496 F.2d at 848-49.
21 58 T.C. at 226, 232.
See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
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time. Any doubts were understandably resolved against Buff, given the
circumstances under which he obtained the money.
Similar considerations prevailed in Gilbert v. Commissioner.' The
taxpayer, a major stockholder of a corporation, withdrew funds so that
he could acquire another company to be merged into the original cor-
poration. 4 Only one officer of the corporation knew of the withdrawal of
funds at the time it was made; the board of directors subsequently re-
fused to ratify the taxpayer's actions.' Within two weeks of acquiring
the funds, the taxpayer signed a note for repayment and pledged secur-
ity, the value of which substantially exceeded the loan.2" After the tax-
payer's fortunes suffered reversal a few weeks later, he left for Brazil
and the debt was never repaid.' The tax court,' operating under the
rule which requires it to follow decisions of the appellate court to which
an appeal lies,' ruled in favor of the government, citing the Second Cir-
cuit reversal of its decision in Buff."0 The tax court had not reckoned,
however, with the appellate court's willingness to examine closely the
extent of dominion and control retained by the taxpayer over repay-
ment and the policy implications of the acquisition of funds. The tax-
payer won on appeal because he had backed up his promise to repay
with adequate security"1 and because the funds had been acquired to
help the corporation. 2
Finally, in United States v. Merrill,' the taxpayer was not taxed on
trustee commissions which he agreed to repay after discovering that he
did not have a right to keep them.' He did not pledge security, but his
good faith was unquestioned and he made restitution in two years.' The
552 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1977).
I & at 479.
, Id& at 479-80.
26 IdL
Id at 480.
28 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 451 (1976).
2 See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 456 (citing Buff v. Commissioner, 496 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1974)).
, 552 F.2d at 481. In Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 1975), an un-
authorized payment had been obtained from a corporation for the benefit of a controlling
employee. The court in Gilbert stated that the difference between Quinn and Gilbert was
that, in Quinn, there had been no contemporaneous acknowledgement of the obligation to
repay, 552 F.2d at 481 n.8. In Quinn, the acknowledgement occurred in the form of a note
and security of unspecified value about three months after the money had been received,
524 F.2d at 619; but in Gilbert, the acknowledgement occurred within about two weeks of
the receipt, 552 F.2d at 479. A better way to distinguish Quinn from Gilbert would have
been the fact that, although Quinn gave a note, he apparently did not give adequate secur-
ity.
552 F.2d at 481.
211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954).
Id at 304.
3S r
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absence of illegality in the acquisition of these funds was probably rele-
vant not only in indicating the likelihood of repayment, but also as a fac-
tor inclining the court towards a decision in favor of the taxpayer. 6
The case law dealing with funds received subject to an obligation to
repay can be summarized as follows. The distinction between embezzle-
ment and borrowing is usually so clear, both in terms of dominion and
control and the desirability of the taxpayer's acquisition of the funds,
that the court need not be self-conscious in applying these criteria.
When there is a consent to repay improperly acquired funds, however,
courts deal with the relevant criteria more explicitly. Close cases are
decided by examining how much control over repayment the taxpayer
retains and what social value attaches to the acquisition of the funds.
The next section will discuss instances of borrowing in which an explicit
focus on the dominion and control and the social value of the loan would
make the tax-free status of the loan very questionable.
TAXABLE LOANS?
The circumstances under which some borrowers obtain loans make
them much closer to the embezzler than to the typical borrower. Three
such situations are borrowing from related entities, nonrecourse loans
secured by appreciated property and nonrecourse purchase money loans
in tax shelters.
Borrowing from Related Entities
When an owner of a corporation or other business obtains a loan from
the business, tax deferral depends on the loan's having economic reality,
demonstrated by the taxpayer's solvency or pledge of adequate securi-
ty,37 and on an "intent to repay" the loan.' The "intent to repay" test
will be examined here because its interpretation is insufficiently in-
fluenced by the considerations which should determine whether the tax-
ation of funds received subject to an obligation to repay ought to be
deferred. 9
' Cf. I.R.C. § 1341(a) (repayments of funds received under a claim of right can be
deducted at the higher of the tax rates in the year of receipt or repayment).
3 See, e.g., Fisher y. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 905, 910-11 (1970) ("loan" to insolvent
general manager was "salary"; general manager was father of 100% shareholder). In Estate
of Helene Simmons v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 409, 424 (1956), the court noted that the tax-
payer was a wealthy woman able to repay the debt.
' Haber v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 255, 266 (1969), affd, 422 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1970);
Chism's Estate v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 1963); Fisher v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 905, 910 (1970); Estate of Helene Simmons v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 409, 423 (1956).
", The loan status of a transfer may also be doubtful in settings other than a distribution
of cash by a business to a controlling owner. Contributions to a business may be equity con-
19801
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The following example illustrates the difficulty with the "intent to
repay" test. The taxpayer has a controlling interest in a corporation. He
finds that his salary is too low for his personal needs in year 1 and he
borrows $10,000 from the corporation. He gives the corporation a note,
but there is no interest or security pledged, and no time is specified for
repayment. In both years 4 and 6, the taxpayer repays $2,000. At first
glance, it seems very strange to exclude the $10,000 from income in year
1 merely because the taxpayer intends to repay. The taxpayer need not
follow up on his intent, can choose to repay in a low tax year and can
postpone repayment for a long time. Moreover, low interest consumer
loans by a business to a controlling owner are not the typical loans
which would be disrupted if loans were generally taxable. In other con-
texts, the Internal Revenue Code is not sympathetic to loans between a
taxpayer and a related entity.
0
These considerations have, in fact, combined with the vagueness of
the "intent to repay" test to produce "special scrutiny" of such transac-
tions. 1 In an extreme case-when there is no note, no interest, no
security, no repayment and no time limit on repayment-the taxpayer
is very likely to be taxed in year 1 on the distribution."2 But it remains
to be determined whether special scrutiny of such transactions strikes
the right balance in deciding when to tax the "borrower." The key ques-
tion should not be whether the taxpayer ever intends to repay, but
tributions to a corporation, I.R.C. § 385, or to a business collaborator, C.M. Gooch Lumber
Sales Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 649, 658-60 (1968), or may be income if there is no expec-
tation of repayment whatsoever, Fairchild v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1505 (1970). In
a family setting, the "loan" may be a gift.
' See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4941(b)(1)(B) (excise tax on loan to private foundation by related par-
ties); I.R.C. § 675(2)-(3) (trust grantors taxed on trust income when they borrow without in-
terest or security, unless trust is generally authorized to make such loans).
" Haber v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 255, 266 (1969) (petitioner and brother control corpora-
tion); Roschuni v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1193, 1202 (1958) (control because of legal owner-
ship and position as sole heir and sole administratrix of estate owning most of the rest of
the stock).
' See, e.g., Haber v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 255, 266 (1969) (no note, no security, no time
limit, no interest, no repayment); cf. Spheeris v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir.
1961) (same, except one repayment after tax investigation had begun); Roschuni v. Commis-
sioner, 29 T.C. 1193, 1202 (1958) (same, except insubstantial repayments prior to commence-
ment of tax investigation); Wilson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 251, 253, 256 (1948) (same, ex-
cept occasional repayments).
If the distribution is taxable, the question remains whether it is salary or a dividend.
Compare Haber v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. at 267-68 (salary; no earnings and profits avail-
able for payment of dividends) with Roschuni v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. at 1204 (dividend to
the extent of earnings and profits).
Taxpayers sometimes argue that distributions called "loans" are instead taxable pay-
ments of income and that later "debt" forgiveness is therefore not income. However, the
courts are properly reluctant to give taxpayers such control over timing, and taxpayers are
not allowed to challenge the label they attach to the transaction. See, e.g., Weise v. Com-
missioner, 93 F.2d 921, 922 (8th Cir. 1938); Crancer v. Lowden, 121 F.2d 643, 645 (2d Cir.
1941).
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whether the control over repayment is so substantial that deferral is
inappropriate. The test should be whether the taxpayer "intended to
use [corporate] funds as her own financial needs and conveniences dic-
tated."'"
It is difficult to be certain that such a refinement would make a dif-
ference, but several factors would probably be applied differently in
determining "intent to repay." First, the debtor's giving a note to the
corporation would make very little difference if the test focused on tax-
payer control over repayment. The only effect of the note would be to
increase the ability of corporate creditors to enforce payment in the
unlikely case that the corporation was unable to pay these creditors."
Second, partial repayments would lose much of their significance if they
were determined primarily by the personal convenience of the debtor. 5
Such a modification falls well within the courts' discretion to develop
tax doctrine sensitive to the underlying rationale for the rule,"8 barring
a complete restructuring of the law to tax loans to individuals who con-
trol the lender.
7
Nonrecourse Debt Secured by Appreciated Property
Debtors often pledge appreciated property as an additional guarantee
that they will repay a loan, but a nonrecourse debtor promises to do no
Roschuni v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1193, 1203 (1958). If the debtor has a business part-
ner who can enforce the debt, the debtor's control may be too uncertain to deny loan status,
at least if loans are not made to both owners in proportion to their ownership interests.
White v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1562, 1567-68 (1952).
" For example, in Haber v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 255 (1969), the court placed excessive
emphasis on whether the debt was enforceable in bankruptcy, id. at 267, even though that
is not relevant to the question whether the debtor intends to repay, and whether repay-
ment will be deferred for an extended period.
" Partial repayment is presently an important factor in determining loan status, see
Estate of Helene Simmons v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 409, 424 (1956), unless the payments
are insubstantial, see Roschuni v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1193, 1203-04 (1958), are occa-
sional, see Wilson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 251, 253, 256 (1948), or are made after tax pro-
ceedings have begun, see Spheeris v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1961);
Roschuni v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. at 1203.
If distributions are taxable dividends, repayments are either deductible as capital losses
under Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), or are nondeductible contributions to
capital. H the distributions are taxable salary, the repayments are probably deductible
under I.R.C. § 162(a).
Sensitivity to these considerations is evident in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner,
544 F.2d 1045, 1048 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976). The court went so far as to forbid a nonrecourse
debtor from proving that he thought the purchase price approximated the value of the
property, even though the issue of value was relevant, precisely because it indicated
whether the debtor was likely to repay the debt.
41 H. GUMPEL, TAXATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 9/2.2e(2) (Harvard Law
School World Tax Series 2d ed. 1969) (loan to shareholder may be a constructive dividend);
M. NORR, TAXATION IN FRANCE § 9/2.3 (Harvard Law School World Tax Series 1966) (rebut-
table presumption that loan to shareholder is a dividend).
1980]
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more than pay the debt or give the security to the creditor, at the deb-
tor's option. For example, an individual who paid $100 for stock which
has appreciated to $140, may borrow $125, pledging the stock as securi-
ty without risking any other assets. 8 Or an employee may borrow
money, pledging as security a retirement annuity for which he has paid
nothing and which has been provided tax-free by the employer, with no
risk other than a reduction of the annuity at some future date.49 Unlike
the recourse debtor, the nonrecourse debtor can retain cash equal to the
loan if the security becomes worthless. The nonrecourse borrower will
have an incentive to repay the debt if the value of the property is at
least equal to the loan, but his option to avoid repayment if the security
declines in value puts him in a very different psychological position
from the recourse debtor. The strings on the nonrecourse debtor's
money, though not "invisible," are certainly much less visible than in
the case of the recourse debtor. 0
The nonrecourse debtor is also in a position to avoid ever paying tax
on the loan. The law requires an unpaid nonrecourse debt to be included
in income when property securing the debt is transferred to the credi-
tor. 1 Thus, if the debtor still owes $125 on the pledged stock when the
stock is transferred to the creditor to repay the loan, the $125 debt
should be taxed in the year of the transfer. Similarly, if the employee
who borrowed on his retirement annuity does not repay the loan, he
should include the loan in income when he collects his annuity.2 It will
be easy for the taxpayer and the government to overlook these events
as taxable transactions, however, because cash is not transferred to the
taxpayer.' Like the embezzler, the nonrecourse borrower who pledges
appreciated property may never pay tax on the loan.
Finally, the tax advantages enjoyed by the borrower who pledges ap-
preciated property accrue to taxpayers who already enjoy a substantial
amount of untaxed economic security. We may not want to adopt a
wealth tax in this country,' but the absence of such a tax argues
See, e.g., Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1952).
41 See, e.g., Minnis v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1049 (1979).
'o See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra. If the taxpayer is personally liable, how-
ever, the strings are quite visible and the loan should not be taxed. See Arlen v. Commis-
sioner, 48 T.C. 640, 647-48 (1967).
" Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1947); Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656,
660-62 (1977), aff'd in part, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978); Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. 264 (loss
measured by subtracting the debt from basis, not value); see Bittker, Tax Shelters, Non-
recourse Deb and the Crane Case, 33 TAX. L. REV. 277, 283-84 (1978); cf. Tufts v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978) (property transferred to a third party).
' The court expressed some doubt on this point in Minnis v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
1049, 1056-57 (1979).
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM 66 (1978).
Compare Cooper, Taking Wealth Taxation Seriously, 34 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 24 (1979)
with Verbit, Taxing Wealth: Recent Proposals from the United States, France, and the
United Kingdom, 60 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1980).
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strongly for not adopting income tax rules that favor taxpayers with
significant wealth advantages.
These considerations have not prevailed under current law, however.
In Woodsam Associates v. Commissioner,55 the court held that tax-
payers who pledge appreciated property pay no tax on the loan even
when the debt is nonrecourse and the loan exceeds the basis of the
pledged property. Also, in Minnis v. Commissioner,' the tax court
declined an opportunity to tax nonrecourse loans secured by retirement
annuities funded by tax-free employer contributions. There are doctri-
nal weaknesses in these opinions which suggest that a bias against tax-
ing loans distorted the decisions. In Woodsam Associates, the court re-
quired a disposition of property as a condition of taxing gain, 7 even
though the Internal Revenue Code section cited as authority merely
described how to compute gain in a taxable disposition, while another
section taxed gain without regard to whether there was a disposition.'
In Minnis, the tax court was influenced by the fact that Congress had
already dealt with the problem of tax-free loans in the case of owner-
employees,59 even though drawing negative inferences from selective
legislative action is a highly questionable practice.' The tax court was
also persuaded that legislative policy favored insurance policy loans,
even though the tax statute favors such loans only when the taxpayer
has already invested after-tax funds."1 Other courts, more sensitive to
the considerations that should govern the taxation of loans, might reach
a different result.
62
Nonrecourse Debt in Tax Shelters
In a tax shelter, the purchase of investment property is financed by a
198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
71 T.C. 1049 (1979).
17 198 F.2d at 359.
See 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
818-19 (1972).
" 71 T.C. at 1056.
, See, e.g., United States v. Midland Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 60 (1965); Knetsch v.
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 367 (1960).
11 71 T.C. at 1055 n.6. The loans favored by I.R.C. § 264(c)(1) are those in which the tax-
payer makes a substantial investment of his own funds during the first seven years of the
insurance policy's life. The single premium contracts disfavored by I.R.C. § 264(a)(2) & (b)
are those in which the taxpayer has made a nominal investment. See H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025,
4056. Similarly, the loans disfavored by I.R.C. § 264(a)(3) involve no out-of-pocket invest-
ment. H.R. REP. No. 794, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1963).
1 There were also special facts which might distinguish these cases. In Woodsam Asso-
ciates, the taxpayer rather than the government argued for taxing the loan to obtain a
higher basis. 198 F.2d at 359. In Minnis, an IRS employee had told the taxpayer that the
loan was tax-free, and the loan was in fact repaid the next year. 71 T.C. at 1051.
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nonrecourse purchase money mortgage. The equity and policy con-
siderations in allowing tax deferred loans to finance investments may
seem very different from those applicable to embezzlers and borrowers
who enjoy the unrestricted use of funds.' However, the inclusion of un-
paid debt in basis, which is available for depreciation and other ac-
celerated deductions," allows the tax shelter investor to convert the
loan into a tax deferred consumer loan available for unrestricted use,
with significant equity and policy implications. This is illustrated in
Table II. An individual makes a $1,000,000 investment, using $150,000 of
his own funds and borrowing the remaining $850,000 by a nonrecourse
loan (column 1).65 The loan is repayable in level payments over 10 years,
with interest computed at 100/0 on unpaid debt (column 2); total annual
payments of debt and interest are $138,334." Accelerated depreciation
is available (column 3)6 and receipts from the venture are $100,000 per
year (column 4). The conversion of the tax deferred investment loan to a
tax deferred consumption loan is apparent from a comparison of col-
umns 3 and 5, summarized in column 6. Column 5 records the deprecia-
tion available if the depreciation deductions are limited to out-of-pocket
investment, thereby eliminating the deduction for unpaid debt. For ex-
ample, in year 1, the total undeducted investment of $203,334 exceeds
the $200,000 depreciation deduction (column 3), which is therefore fully
available with or without the limit. In year 2, however, there is a differ-
ence between allowing depreciation with and without the limit. In year
See generally text accompanying notes 11-62 supra.
, See Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340, 351-52 (1966).
An investor typically puts up 10-30% of the cost of the venture. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, REAL ESTATE TAX SHELTER SUBSIDIES AND DIRECT SUBSIDY ALTERNATIVES
3-5, 14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CBO]; McDaniel, Tax Shelters and Tax Policy, 26 NAT'L
TAX J. 353, 378 (1973).
" Level payments are computed by determining the debt repayment for year 1 and add-
ing the interest on unpaid debt (10% of the $850,000 unpaid debt in Table I). The debt
repayment for year 1 is then subtracted from unpaid debt and the interest in year 2 is 10%
of remaining unpaid debt. The interest for year 2 is then subtracted from the level payment
already computed for year 1 to determine the debt repayment for year 2. This process is
repeated to determine interest for year 3 and so on. The formula for debt repayment for
year 1 is Total Debt = lx + (1 + i)'x + (1 + i)2 x + . . . (1 + ij'lx, where i equals the in-
terest rate, n equals the number of payment periods, and x equals the debt repayment in
year 1. Solving for x and rounding to the nearest dollar in Table I results in x = $53,334.
The last payment in year 10 is adjusted so that the total debt payments are $850,000. The
reduction is necessary due to rounding. The level payment in Table I is $138,334, except in
year 10.
67 The double declining method used in Table I is not available in all cases. The major ex-
ception is certain real estate investment. See I.R.C. § 167(a(b), (j). Other tax benefits that
may be available in the early years of the shelter are: first, the investment credit, I.R.C. §
38 (land and buildings are not usually eligible for this credit, id. § 48(a)(1); second, the deduc-
tion for interest and taxes related to construction of an asset, i. § 163(a), 164(a); but see id. §
189 (limiting deduction of such expenses when they involve real estate construction); third,
fees paid to general partners, but see Rev. Rul. 75-204, 1975-1 C.B. 185 (requiring such fees
to be capitalized); fourth, intangible drilling costs to find oil and gas, I.R.C. § 263(c).
[Vol. 56:43
") C '1 ' I
IfI
4.)
- ... i
&4 ") ,_ ., V
co 0
CD
4)
C)I
.4.)
'-4 ~
0'
CD It- 0
t- ~ ~ m Iq m CDwmw
CD 0 1") Z) 0
(:> o t t-L 0
CQI
~C Cl tU) 0
m " O 0D
00 '"C'1 0o('-
=~ CD C> 1- 4 m~ m- m~ m~ m
C 0 00 C1T4mML In LO C
=ODOLf)L ) 00t c
00 r-qr- 0)0Lf
C0= - C L-00C~L) r00 m
0C) o Cl "I"c f ) t
to) oo) co 6 i I0 00 it 6 CC) Lq
LO = c t- C~ CQ -4 -4v I"
1-4
1980]
;0 0 U
Cd
Cd C
4)
4)a )0.0
CIO
co ;1
,3-0)
co O'0
to
2 ce
.
.80
Lo
0oc
.c )C(D '4d4
4) W=~
E- E-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
2, the $58,667 investment (column 1) is added to the $3,334 of unde-
ducted investment from prior years, but the total is well below the
$160,000 depreciation allowed without a limit (column 3). Existing law
without a limit therefore allows unpaid debt to shelter $97,999 (column
6) from tax in year 2, even though this amount of cash is available for
unrestricted use. The cash flow sheltered by deducting unpaid debt in
the early years is exactly offset, however, by the excess of debt pay-
ments over depreciation deductions in later years, as the zero sum in
column 6 shows. The deduction of unpaid debt through depreciation is
therefore the precise equivalent of accruing unpaid debt to offset a con-
sumer loan in the amount of the previously sheltered cash, a loan which
is repayable at a later date out of after-tax income.
The equity and policy implications of deferring tax on such loans are
questionable. First, repayment out of after-tax income may never occur.
Tax shelter investors are suspected of underreporting income in the
year they dispose of encumbered property, thereby failing to include
the previously sheltered cash in income.68 Second, the investor can
choose when he transfers the property to the creditor, thereby control-
ling the year in which the tax is due. Third, tax shelters favor well-off
investors because they have the risk capital to put up the initial invest-
ment, thereby obtaining what are in effect low interest consumer
loans. 9 Policies favoring consumer loans can hardly be meant to have
that result. Fourth, the investments made with these nonrecourse loans
are of questionable social value because the tax incentives are ineffi-
cient.0 In sum, the tax shelter encourages investments of questionable
social value which provide high income taxpayers with the equivalent of
unrestricted low interest consumer loans in which the debtor can con-
trol the year of repayment and can often avoid repaying the debt out of
after-tax income. The closest analogy to these loans is the homeowner's
loan, which is available with an investment of a small amount of the
original purchase price at interest rates less than typical consumer
loans, and under circumstances in which the creditor expects to look pri-
marily to the home for collection of any unpaid debt. There are impor-
tant differences, however, between the homeowner's loan and the tax
" See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 53.
" See CBO, supra note 65, at 112 (assuming 71/2% interest rate); McDaniel, supra note
65, at 378 (assuming 8% interest rate). Small Loans Acts generally allow interest rates well
over 18% per year. See 1 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 540 (1980). These loans are completely
unrestricted in use. Open end credit, which is the typical revolving credit arrangement with
a retail store or bank credit card purchase, is usually available at about 18% interest. See
i& 630.
70 CBO, supra note 65, at 37; Panel Discussion on General Tax Reform Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 553, 556-58 (1973) (statement of
Jerome Kurtz); McDaniel, supra note 65, at 360-61, 369-71, 373-76.
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shelter loan. The homeowner's loan is not limited to high bracket tax-
payers and the policy considerations have always been thought to favor
homeowners.
71
This analysis suggests that Congress should re-examine the availabil-
ity of tax deferred consumer loans provided through the deduction of
unpaid nonrecourse debt. Current legislation is extremely inadequate;
the law prevents such debt from creating deductible operating losses to
shelter nonventure income, 72 but does not apply if the debt shelters ven-
ture income, if the taxpayer is a corporation that is not closely held" or
if the venture is a real estate investment.7 ' Allowing the deduction to
shelter venture income might rest on the theory that tax abuse arises
primarily from sheltering a large amount of nonventure income. How-
ever, the tax advantage is derived from sheltering both venture and
nonventure income. If an incentive to invest in ventures with a substan-
tial amount of income is desirable because such ventures are productive
without regard to tax losses, the correct provision is to allow unpaid
nonrecourse debt to shelter venture income only if that income is sub-
stantial. Allowing corporations that are not closely held to shelter
nonventure income might rest on the mistaken assumption that the
sheltered cash cannot be made available to shareholders tax-free;75 but,
in fact, shareholders will often be able to obtain the use of such cash
without paying tax.71 Finally, allowing real estate activity to retain tax
shelter advantages is difficult to justify on policy grounds because of
the inefficiencies of such incentives.
77
The disallowance of a deduction for unpaid debt should be compared
with other approaches to dealing with tax shelter abuses. The disallow-
ance of such a deduction, although it has its advocates,78 is the less
7' See, e.g., I.R.C. § 461(g)(2) (allowing a deduction for prepaid interest on homeowner
loans).
Id. § 465(a), (d).
7 Id. § 465(a)(1).
71 Id § 465(c)(3)(D)(i).
" The possibility of a tax on a corporate distribution exists because the excess of ac-
celerated over straight-line depreciation shelters cash from corporate tax but does not
eliminate earnings and profits for dividend distribution. See I.R.C. § 312(k)(1).
7' First, the opportunity to obtain unrestricted cash persists if the sheltering deductions
are expensed costs, not depreciation. Second, unrestricted cash is available to the investors
by borrowing on the value of the corporate stock inflated by cash sheltered from tax at the
corporate level. Third, if corporate retention of cash coincides with the investors' expendi-
ture decisions, retention does not impose undesired restrictions on the use of the cash. See
generally McDaniel, supra note 65, at 354-66.
7 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
7' See, e.g., S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 250-51 (1973); Panel Discussion, supra
note 70, at 571 (statement of Jerome Kurtz); Andrews, supra note 9, at 1137, 1153-55,
1181-83. The importance of the deduction of unpaid debt to tax shelters is explained in
Analyses Prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation,
Special Supp. No. 17, pt. H to 63 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) (Mar. 31, 1976) at 7, 20, 38,
46, 63, 71, 82-83.
1980]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
familiar approach to dealing with tax shelters. It is more common to em-
phasize the tax advantages which provide a deduction for savings,
either temporarily, by accelerating deductions, or permanently, by in-
adequate recapture.79 Both approaches focus on improper deductions
which, as the consumption tax literature has shown, are the equivalent
of taxing the income shielded by the deductions and exempting the
return on the after-tax income." This equivalence prompts a third sug-
gestion, which is disallowing the interest deduction to the extent the
loan is invested to produce the equivalent of tax exempt income.' These
approaches are not identical. Eliminating the deduction for savings ends
the exemption of income to the extent the savings deduction provided
the equivalent of tax-exempt income. Disallowing the deduction of un-
paid debt permits the equivalent of exempting income only to the extent
the income is earned on out-of-pocket investment. Disallowing interest
deductions on loans invested to produce the equivalent of tax-exempt in-
come prevents the exemption of income in the amount of the interest,
but allows the equivalent of an exemption on out-of-pocket investment,
and on the leveraged gain earned on the investment financed by borrow-
ing. Table III illustrates these approaches more fully.2
' See, e.g., CBO, supra note 65, at 121-40 (accelerated deductions and inadequate recap-
ture); Tax Reform Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1473-87 (1975) (statement of Jerome Kurtz) (same); McKee, The Real Estate Tax
Shelter: A Computerized Exposd, 57 VA. L. REV. 521, 541-42 (1971) (accelerated deductions).
McKee further states that disallowing the deduction for unpaid debt is a "far less precise"
solution than eliminating accelerated deductions. Id. at 565.
1o U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 123-24 (1977); An-
drews, supra note 9, at 1126. For a discussion of the conditions under which this equiva-
lence might not hold, see Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARv.
L. REV. 1575, 1598-1611 (1979).
SI Andrews, supra note 9, at 1139.
Table III assumes that the taxpayer borrows $85 at 7% interest in year 1. He invests
the loan plus $15 of his own, for a total of $100 savings, which produces a 10% return in
year 2. The loan is repayable in year 2. The taxpayer is in the 40% bracket in both years.
The "correct" depreciation method allows no deduction in year 1 and a $100 deduction in
year 2. Accelerated depreciation is allowed, however, so that $100 can be deducted in year
1 and nothing is left over to deduct in year 2. Thus, $100 savings is deductible in year 1. To
provide the cash necessary to cover these expenditures, we assume other income of $25 in
year 1 (to allow the taxpayer another $15 after tax, in addition to the loan, so that $100 can
be saved) and $141.66 in year 2 (to allow the taxpayer sufficient after-tax income to repay
the $85 loan).
Column 1 describes current law which places no tax on borrowing, allows a deduction for
accelerated depreciation which includes unpaid debt and allows a deduction for interest.
The next three columns show the effect of selective withdrawal of benefits. Column 2 elimi-
nates the deduction for saving, allowing only "correct" depreciation. Column 3 limits
depreciation to out-of-pocket investment. Column 4 disallows the deduction of interest to
the extent the loan finances the equivalent of a tax-exempt return through the deduction of
savings.
Eliminating the savings deduction (column 2) costs the taxpayer $2.40, which is the
equivalent of 40% tax payable on $6. Six dollars is the tax-exempt return equivalent of
allowing the deduction of $100 savings, because the deduction is the equivalent of taxing
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Despite the variations among these three approaches, they all focus
on borrowing as the major problem. The argument for eliminating the
deduction of savings in tax shelters is that investments heavily financed
by loans do not deserve tax incentives." The disallowance of the deduc-
tion for interest must also be based on the undesirable incentive effects
of borrowing, because the deduction for interest simply treats bor-
rowers and investors who make out-of-pocket investments alike." Fin-
ally, the disallowance of the deduction of unpaid debt rests on a judg-
ment that the consumer loans thereby created do not deserve tax defer-
ral.85 Identifying borrowing as the central problem suggests, at the very
least, that the solution which explicitly focuses on the effects of tax
deferred borrowing by disallowing the accrual of a deduction for unpaid
nonrecourse debt deserves very careful consideration. There is, how-
ever, another important advantage to emphasizing the problem of
deducting unpaid debt. Eliminating the savings deduction and the
deduction of interest requires legislative action.
Although the deduction of unpaid nonrecourse debt could also be
disallowed by Congress, there are judicial doctrines available to limit
such deductions. First, courts allow taxpayers to include unpaid non-
recourse debt in basis, deductible against cash flow, only if the initial
debt at least approximates the value of the purchased property." In
the savings, leaving $60 to be invested, and exempting the 10% return ($6) from tax. See
note 80 supra. Eliminating the deduction of unpaid debt costs the taxpayer $2.04, which is
85% of $2.40. Eighty-five percent is the portion of the exempt return financed by the loan.
In effect, the exempt return attributable to out-of-pocket investment (15%) retains its tax
advantage. Eliminating the deduction of interest attributable to the exempt return financed
by the loan costs the taxpayer $1.428, which is 70% of 85% of $2.40. In effect, the exempt
return is retained on the investment attributable to out-of-pocket investment (15% of the
total investment) and on the leveraged gain, which is 30% of return on the 85% of the in-
vestment financed by the loan (return of 10% minus 7% interest yields 3% leveraged gain,
which is 30% of the 10% return).
McDaniel, supra note 65, at 360-61, 369-71, 373-76.
" This point can be readily seen by considering how the disallowance of the interest
deduction works under I.R.C. § 265(2). If an investor earning a taxable 7% return shifts his
investment to a 10% tax-exempt return, he increases his real rate of return to 10% but
gives up 7%. The same is true of the investor who, instead of shifting his investment, re-
tains the investment but borrows at 7% interest. He also increases his return to 10%, but
gives up the 7% return to pay interest. The investor who shifts his investment to obtain
tax-exempt income ends up with no taxable income. The borrower would be in the same tax
position if he could deduct the interest, but I.R.C. § 265(2) forbids it. See Denman v.
Slayton, 282 U.S. 514, 519-20 (1930) (discrimination between borrower and self-financer con-
stitutional).
See text accompanying notes 63-77 supra.
Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976); Rev. Rul.
78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58; see Marcus v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 1263, 1273 (1971); Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59. This treatment of nonre-
course debt is an application of a broader principle which is that contingent and speculative
debt cannot be included in the debtor's basis. Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367 (1969),
affd per curiam, 451 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1971) (net profit obligation); Albany Car Wheel Co.
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that case, the equity will build up quickly as the debt is paid and the
purchaser will be unlikely to abandon the property. If the debt exceeds
value, however, the debtor may be tempted to walk away from the prop-
erty and not pay the debt,' an arrangement very much like an option
which the taxpayer might or might not exercise.' For example, if prop-
erty is worth $900,000 and the taxpayer has made an out-of-pocket in-
vestment of $200,000, incurring an $800,000 nonrecourse debt, the
$100,000 equity in the property sufficiently increases the likelihood of
future debt payment that the debtor is allowed to include the debt in
basis. 9 If, on the other hand, the property is worth only $700,000, the
payment of the $800,000 debt is too uncertain to allow it to be accrued
and included in basis. Because this rule is well-established, it is not im-
mediately apparent what difference it would make if the courts were
sensitive to the equity and policy considerations that should underlie
the rule. The point is that such considerations shape the law not only by
affecting the interpretation of tax rules, but also by indicating how
strictly they are applied. The rule including unpaid nonrecourse debt in
basis depends on the value of the purchased property,9 the determina-
tion of which necessarily vests a great deal of discretion in the agency.
9 2
v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963), affd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964) (obligation
conditional); Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773 (1957) (obligation to pay lesser of $25,000
or one-half of net profits); Hoblitzell v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1197 (1960) (obliga-
tion conditional); Rev. Rul. 55-675, 1955-2 C.B. 567 (transferee assumed the transferor-
lessee's lease obligations). If the obligation is contingent but can be valued, as in the case of
a family annuity, the basis for computing depreciation includes the present value of the
future payments promised by the buyer, but basis includes only actual payments for com-
puting realized losses. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352, 353-54.
" See Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976).
u Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 752, 762, 771 (1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 1045
(9th Cir. 1976).
" When there is no equity in the property initially, the court must decide what to do if
equity arises at a later date through increases in value or debt payments. This issue was
left open in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976). See also
Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 834, 849 (1964), affd per curiam, 358
F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1966), in which the court was apparently willing but unable to find that
later events so fixed the obligations that they should be included in basis at that time. In
Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773 (1957), the dissent argued that events after the
original purchase had fixed the obligation and that the debt should therefore be included in
basis at that time. Id. at 779 (Kern, J., dissenting). The majority did not comment explicitly
on this argument.
' See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). The rule itself is an arbitrary line inso-
far as it distinguishes debtors who will pay off a debt from those who will not. Payment is
not a function of current equity but of the debtor's prediction of future equity. A debtor
might make payments on a nonrecourse debt if he thinks the value will rise in the future,
whether or not there is currently equity in the property.
11 Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976) (purchase price
at least approximately equal to value of purchased property); accord, Rev. Rul. 77-110,
1977-1 C.B. 58; Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62.
' Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 651-52 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Whether the agency will look closely at the taxpayer's claims about
value, and whether courts will be tolerant of the agency's fact deter-
mination, should depend on a careful evaluation of the equity and policy
considerations raised by the transaction."
Similar considerations should influence the court's scrutiny of the
basis of recourse debtors whose solvency is doubtful. When a taxpayer
is personally liable but is not solvent, there is good reason to suspect
that the parties do not expect the debtor to pay off the debt and that,
whatever their expectations, payment is unlikely. 4 Courts are some-
times reluctant to consider financial solvency in applying the tax law,95
but in the context of tax shelters, the court should carefully examine
the economic reality of personal liability before concluding that basis in-
cludes debt."
If unpaid debt is not included in basis initially, the courts must decide how to treat
each debt payment, assuming the debt continues to be excluded from basis. There are three
ways to deal with future debt payments. First, unpaid debt could be included in basis for
depreciation, but depreciation deductions would not be allowed to exceed out-of-pocket in-
vestment. This approach is taken in column 5 of Table II and, less severely, by I.R.C. § 465.
See generally Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imagi-
nary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX. L. Rsv. 159, 174 n.22 (1966); sources cited in note 78
supra. It is not clear that courts could apply this approach without guidance from regula-
tions.
Second, each payment could be added to basis when the payment was made. This is
apparently the Commissioner's position. See Denver & R.G.W. R.R. v. United States, 505
F.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352, 353-54. Presumably, this
means that there is a new basis in the acquired asset to which the depreciation percentage
is applied, computing the percentage on the assumption that the asset has a useful life com-
mencing in the year of the new payment. A slightly different approach would treat each
debt payment as a new depreciable cost with its own useful life.
Third, each debt payment could be a depreciation deduction. This is the result when the
debt depends on future sales. Holden Fuel Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 479 F.2d 613, 616 (6th
Cir. 1973); National Util. Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851-18 to 1851-22
(1978); Newton Insert Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 570, 587-89 (1974), affrd per curiam, 545
F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976) (deductions recaptured under I.R.C. § 1245); see Marcus v. Com-
missioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263, 1274 (1971); cf. Rev. Rul. 78-30, 1978-1 C.B. 133 (debt pay-
ments not treated as made by taxpayer when taxpayer not personally liable and third party
personally guaranteed payment; taxpayer mere conduit); Rev. Rul. 77-125, 1977-1 C.B. 130
(same). Analytically, this result has much to recommend it when the debtor has no equity in
the property. In such cases, the creditor appears to be taking the risks of an owner and the
debt payments are similar to an owner's return on equity, with the "debtor" simply passing
the profit along to the creditor. As long as the debtor cannot manipulate the debt payments
by prepaying them or paying them in a high tax bracket year, a full deduction for the debt
payments as depreciation deductions seems proper. The analytical justification for this ap-
proach is diminished, however, if the taxpayer has equity in the property.
' Miller v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 767, 777-78 (1977); cf. McDaniel v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 1037 (1977) (debtor a swindler who never intended to repay loan); May v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 279 (1972) (debtor solvent but no expectation of
repayment).
'" See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 575 (1965); LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415
(1940).
" The Supreme Court's concern with allowing basis to include unpaid obligations is also
apparent in United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 412 U.S. 401 (1973). The
Court interpreted the law under the 1939 Code to conform to the 1954 Code, so that the
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Second, the rules determining taxation when the debtor disposes of
encumbered property should not favor further deferral. 7 A tax is im-
posed if the buyer assumes the liability or takes the property subject to
the debt. 8 The tax court's definition of these terms, however, has given
taxpayers an opportunity to defer tax beyond the year of disposition.
The following example illustrates the problem. A taxpayer owns prop-
erty with an adjusted basis of $40, encumbered by a $100 debt and
worth $150. He has found a buyer who is willing to pay $50 cash in 5
equal annual installments beginning in year 1, giving his negotiable
notes to evidence his obligation. The buyer realizes that he will have to
pay off the $100 debt and is willing to take over the seller's obligation,
which calls for 5 annual $20 installments over the next five years, begin-
ning in year 1. The buyer is also willing to pay the $20 debt payments
directly to the seller, along with the annual $10 installments of the pur-
'chase price, and let the seller pay the mortgagee. The taxpayer wants
very much to avoid paying tax in year 1 on the $60 gain ($100 of unpaid
debt minus $40 basis), as well as on the $50 evidenced by the buyer's
notes. To that end, the seller suggests to the buyer that the buyer prom-
ises to pay the seller $30 per year and the seller promises the buyer
that he will pay the creditor the $20 annual payments necessary to ex-
tinguish the debt. The seller hopes that this will be neither an assump-
tion of liability by the buyer, because the buyer's obligation runs solely
to the seller and not to the creditor, nor a transfer subject to debt,
because the seller promises the buyer that the creditor will be paid.
Under the law in effect prior to October 20, 1980, there is a double
benefit for the seller if he is successful. The $100 unpaid debt will not be
an amount realized, with the result that the $60 gain will not be
recognized in year 1, and the $60 debt in excess of basis will not be a
t"payment" in excess of 30% of the $150 selling price, thereby allowing
the seller to qualify for the installment sale provisions deferring tax on
the payments from the buyer over the 5 year pay-out period. Under the
new law, the seller is eligible for the installment method even if
payments in the year of sale exceed 30% of the selling price. Never-
theless, deferral of the $60 debt in excess of basis is allowed only if the
$100 unpaid debt is not a "payment.""
transaction in question did not give the corporate taxpayer a basis in property which had
been contributed to the corporation at no cost to the corporation. Id at 406-07.
" The rules certainly should not allow exemption of a portion of the loan. The tax court
has prevented an exemption by holding that gross receipts equal unpaid debt, not the lower
of the value of the encumbered property or the unpaid debt. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C..
756 (1978); Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656 (1977), affd in part, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.
1978).
" Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659, 666 (1955).
Compare I.R.C. § 453 (1980) (repealed 1980) with Installment Sales Revision Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, § 2, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 453). In this ex-
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It is difficult to understand how the taxpayer could succeed in this ef-
fort to defer tax on the prior loan even longer than he already has. If he
was not personally liable to the creditor prior to this transaction,
nothing in the arrangement creates a likelihood that the seller will
spend his own funds to pay the creditor. All he has promised the buyer
is that he will be a conduit to pass along the buyer's $20 to pay the
debt.' 0 Even if the seller had been personally liable to the creditor, he
remains little more than a conduit, with the power to enforce payment
of the $100 debt in the creditor's behalf.' Personal liability will require
the seller to pay if the buyer defaults, but that likelihood is not so great
that the buyer is denied a basis for his unpaid debt, and that should be
sufficient to end deferral for the seller.
Surprisingly, the seller has had some success with this strategem. It
turns out that "assuming liability" and taking property "subject to
debt" have a customary nontax meaning. A buyer does not "assume lia-
bility" if his promise runs only to the seller 0. and he does not take prop-
erty "subject to debt" if the seller promises to pay the debt."3 In the
first case to deal with this problem, Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner,0 4
a taxpayer who was personally liable on a note and had structured a
sale in the above fashion was found by the court to be eligible for the in-
stallment sale provisions. In a later case, this benefit was extended to a
nonrecourse debtor who promised the buyer that he would pay the
mortgagee."' The opportunity afforded by these cases for nonrecourse
debtors in tax shelter situations has not gone unnoticed."'
The Commissioner argued in these cases that, for tax purposes, there
was an assumption of liability 7 or taking subject to debt,".. whatever
the niceties of property law,"' but the court simply incorporated nontax
meaning into tax doctrine. It is unlikely that the court was unaware of
its authority to reject nontax meaning to prevent violations of tax
ample, the $30 payment would be allocated between profit and return of basis, 11115 to pro-
fit and 4/15 to basis.
" Cf. Rev. Rul. 78-30, 1978-1 C.B. 133 (nonrecourse debtor conduit for debt payments
when third party personally liable); Rev. Rul. 77-125, 1977-1 C.B. 130 (same).
Cf. Rev. Rul. 65-185, 1965-2 C.B. 153 (pledge of installment claim for cash loan repay-
able by debtor only if installment debtor defaults is a taxable disposition of the installment
claim under I.R.C. § 453(d)).
' Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 659, 666 (1955).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 660-64. The Commissioner of the IRS refused to acquiesce to this decision in
1956-1 C.B. 6.
10' United Pac. Corp. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 721, 723-24, 727 (1963).
... Podolin, How to Handle the Burned Out Tax Shelter, 37 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX., §
16.03[1][a] n.48 (1979).
' United Pac. Corp. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. at 728.
Stonecrest Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. at 668.
1 Cf. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930) (rejecting incorporation of refinements
of property law into the tax law).
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policy.11 It is more likely that the court was too tolerant of tax defer-
ral"1 and insensitive to the fact that sheltering cash flow with unpaid
debt had already given the taxpayer a significant and controversial
benefit. Greater sensitivity to these considerations should lead to over-
ruling the Stonecrest doctrine"1 and should, in any event, prevent the
use of that doctrine by tax shelter investors disposing of tax shelter
property.
LOANS IN A CONSUMPTION TAX
There are no theoretical uncertainties about how to tax loans in a con-
sumption tax. A loan should be included in taxable receipts and de-
ducted if the proceeds are saved. The accrual of unpaid debt, which
results in the exclusion of loans from income in an income tax, is entirely
inappropriate in a consumption tax. Accrual of an obligation is a deduc-
tion for an anticipated loss in savings, which is arguably proper in an in-
come tax in which increases and decreases in savings are included in
computing the tax base. In a consumption tax, however, an increase in
savings is deductible and a decrease in savings is a signal for taxation,
not a reason for a reduction in the tax base. Unless the taxpayer can
show that the savings reduction did not result in consumption, either
because it was matched by another investment or because it resulted
from a casualty loss, a decline in savings results in an increase in the
consumption tax base. In a consumption tax, therefore, taxpayers who
borrow for consumption, pledging appreciated property, cannot defer
tax; and purchase money debtors who acquire property would pay no
tax at the time of the loan, but would have no basis to offset later cash
flow. This taxation of borrowing is consistent with the effect of the con-
sumption tax in remaining neutral between current and future consump-
tion.1 Table IV shows the proper treatment of loans in a consumption
tax. The taxpayer is in the 40% bracket and borrows $100 in year 1 at
7% interest, which he invests to yield a 10% return. The year 2 repay-
110 Cf. Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977) & cases cited therein (interpreting "lia-
bility" in I.R.C. § 357(c) to exclude the accounts payable of a cash basis taxpayer).
"I In United Pac. Corp., 39 T.C. at 727-28, the tax court emphasized the policies of the
installment sale provisions, completely neglecting the problem of deferring tax on past in-
come.
112 The tax court has shown an increasing concern for these problems .in Voight v. Com-
missioner, 68 T.C. 99 (1977), affd per curiam, 614 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1980), in which the Com-
missioner persuaded the court that a buyer's guarantee to the creditor followed by direct
payments to the creditor was an "assumption of liability" under the Stonecrest doctrine,
whether or not it was technically an assumption under state law. Id. at 110-14. Voight
might be a harbinger of an overruling of Stonecrest. But see Levinton, Use of Wrap-
Around Mortgages Can Expand Installment Sales Despite LRS Opposition, 51 J. TAX. 166
(1979).
113 Andrews, supra note 9, at 1167-69; see note 10 supra.
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ment is deductible because the loan was taxable. The gain is consumed
in year 2.
TABLE IV
TAXATION OF BORROWING IN A CONSUMPTION TAX
Real Cash Flow Tax Computation
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2
Borrowing + $100.00 + $100.00
Investment - 100.00 - 100.00
Return + $ 10.00 + $ 10.00
Interest - 7.00 - 7.00
Sale of
Investment + 100.00 + 100.00
Repayment
of Loan - 100.00 - 100.00
Gain 0 + 3.00 0 3.00
x 40%
Tax - 1.20 1.20
After-tax
Consumption + 1.80
This theoretical simplicity is not always matched by administrative
convenience, however. The recording of the loan as a taxable receipt in
year 1 may create so many problems that taxpayers will not accept such
a requirement.1 1 4 The major difficulty is with consumer loans."' For ex-
ample, if a taxpayer takes out a loan to buy a consumer durable or a
home, he may be reluctant to record the loan in taxable receipts for
several reasons. If the investment is not deductible, he may have diffi-
culty paying the tax, even with an averaging provision."' If the invest-
ment is deductible, the taxpayer may be so unfamiliar with including
loans in taxable receipts that this method of computing the tax base will
not be acceptable.11 7 The easiest solution seems to be to ignore both the
borrowing and the investment and not require the taxpayer to take into
account the future consumption value of the investment. To compensate
for not reporting the consumption value, the interest would not be
deductible."8 Exempting the consumption return financed by the loan
114 See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1153-59.
See i&d. at 1154-59.
11 See id, at 1156-57.
117 Graetz, supra note 80, at 1618-19.
... Andrews, supra note 9, at 1156, 1158; Graetz, supra note 80, at 1618.
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might seem nothing more than an implementation of the established
relationship between deducting savings, which is permitted in a con-
sumption tax, and disallowing the deduction but exempting the
return."1 Exempting the entire return financed by the loan is not the
correct result, however, as Table V shows. Table V assumes that $100 is
borrowed to finance a $100 investment in a consumer durable in year 1.
Interest and loan payments are $17 in year 2. They are paid out of $17
other income. The real return in consumption value before interest and
repayment of debt is $20. The taxpayer is in the 40% bracket in both
years. The correct, though unfamiliar, way to tax the transaction under
a consumption tax is in column 1. The loan is reported, the investment
and interest are deducted and the imputed return on the investment is
reported annually. The column 1 approach is therefore unfamiliar in two
respects-the loan and an imputed return are reported on the tax
return.1 0 Column 2 assumes borrowing, investment, imputed return and
interest are all not taken into account. The difference between the two
methods of dealing with the consumer loan is $1.20, favoring the column
2 "omission" approach. This amount is equal to the tax that would have
been paid on the $3 of leveraged gain financed by the loan.' The dis-
allowance of the interest deduction did not result in that gain being
taxed."
The error which leads to this result is the assumption that disallow-
ing the deduction of savings, which is deductible in a consumption tax, is
the equivalent of exempting the full 10% return on the $100 investment.
As shown in 6olumn 3 of Table V, the equivalence is achieved by ex-
empting the 10% return on only $60, the amount that would be left
after paying a 40% tax on the savings. If the taxpayer includes the loan
in taxable receipts and pays $40 tax because the savings are not deduc-
tible, the remaining $60 could be invested to produce a $12 return. The
taxpayer in column 3, who receives that return tax free, ends up in the
same position as the taxpayer in column 1, which is the correct con-
sumption tax result." ' This correct result is achieved without having to
be concerned with the difficult administrative task of imputing and tax-
ing the $20 return in year 2, as is required by the column 1 approach.
" Andrews, supra note 9, at 1126.
120 Andrews, supra note 9, at 1157; see Graetz, supra note 80, at 1614; U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 80, at 121.
Ill Graetz, supra note 80, at 1619, 1622, notes that disallowing the interest deduction only
"approximates" the correct result.
'" See column 4 of Table M, supra, and the related discussion of the shortcomings of
disallowing an interest deduction.
1 Andrews would allow the taxpayer to elect this result, but would not require it. An-
drews, supra note 9, at 1156.
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TAXATION OF BORROWING
The tax benefit of not taking into account the consumer loan and the
imputed return (column 2) is not objectionable if social policy favors the
result. Many would argue for the favorable treatment of borrowing to
finance consumption, at least in regard to homes.12 ' However, this result
might unduly encourage borrowing in an increasingly inflationary
economy." The incentive to borrow is aggravated by the fact that tax-
payers who invest their own funds would not receive such favorable
treatment unless they could defer tax until the time of consumption
without imputing a correct return on the investment.26 The taxation of
consumer loans and the exemption of the return on after-tax investment
(column 3) may therefore be a desirable approach. The only exception
might be ordinary consumer credit financing of current consumption,
such as that financed by bank credit cards. In theory, there should be no
delay until payment of the debt to tax the consumption. But the delay is
usually so short, and the interest rate sufficiently high, that disallow-
ance of the interest 'deduction is an acceptable result."
Even if the imperfection in the taxation of consumer loans is accep-
table, it is important to understand that an imperfection exists. The
United States Treasury Department analysis of a consumption tax
seems to be indifferent between, on the one hand, taxing the loan and
deducting the investment and, on the other hand, allowing the taxpayer
to elect to leave out of account the loan, the investment, the return and
the interest (the column 2 approach)," even when there is no reason to
exempt the leveraged gain from tax. Absent a good reason for such ex-
emption, the proper treatment of borrowing in a consumption tax is to
include the loan in taxable receipts. Only after including the loan should
consideration be given to allowing the taxpayer a choice of deducting
the investment, or electing not to deduct the investment, paying the tax
and excluding the return on the after-tax investment from the tax base.
This discussion of the proper taxation of borrowing in a consumption
tax is also relevant to the definition of income in an income tax. One
'
2See id. at 1159-60.
' This is especially true of luxury consumption assets that could produce speculative
gain, such as jewelry and antique cars. Prepayment of tax on investments in such assets
should, in theory, result in excluding the gain from the tax base under a consumption tax.
But see Andrews, supra note 9, at 1156, 1158-60; Graetz, supra note 80, at 1616-18. What-
ever the result when investors use their own funds, the imperfection of excluding both bor-
rowing and the gain when the purchase of the asset is financed by borrowing would unduly
favor speculation in such assets.
,'2 The taxpayer who invests $60 of his own funds after paying a $40 tax would receive an
exempt 12% return, which is the correct consumption tax result. If the taxpayer could post-
pone tax until the year of consumption, he would be in the same position only if a $20
return were imputed to his investment, leaving him with $12 after paying a 40% tax.
'= Andrews, supra note 9, at 1154-55.
1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 80, at 115, 124-25, 127, 131.
19801
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
result of considering a consumption tax seriously is to highlight the ex-
isting imperfections in the taxation of the savings component--of in-
come." An awareness of these imperfections promotes a concern with
accurately defining consumption, even if savings are not always taxed.
In the context of borrowing, this concern suggests that a tax on con-
sumer loans should not be deferred because of the possibility that sav-
ings, so often untaxed when they are clearly present, might decline in
the future as a result of repaying the loan. At least in close cases,1
loans should be taxed under an income tax when they are received, and
the repayment should be deducted when savings are depleted to repay
the loan in a later year.
CONCLUSION
The exclusion of borrowing from the tax base is a serious error in a
consumption tax if the loan finances consumption, and is more prob-
lematical in an income tax than is commonly supposed. The issue is not
only of concern to Congress. Courts have been insufficiently sensitive to
the relevant equity and policy considerations in allowing deferral of tax
on loans by owners who borrow from controlled entities, by nonrecourse
debtors who pledge appreciated property as security and by tax shelter
investors who deduct unpaid nonrecourse debt to obtain low interest
consumer loans. Such loans provide an opportunity to consume that is
often indistinguishable from the receipt of taxable funds received sub-
ject to an obligation to repay. The analogy of such loans to these
receipts and the adoption of a consumption tax perspective on income
tax problems would end tax deferral for many consumer loans.
12 Andrews, supra note 9, at 1128-31, 1135-36, 1139-40.
",O See notes 37-112 & accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 56:43
